Abstract-Measurements of received signal strength (RSS) on wireless links provide position information in various localization systems, including multilateration-based and fingerprint-based positioning systems, and device-free localization systems. Existing localization schemes assume a fixed or known transmit power. Therefore, any variation in transmit power can result in error in location estimate. In this paper, we present a generic framework for detecting power attacks and identifying the source of such transmit power variation. Our results show that we can achieve close to zero missed detections and false alarms with RSS measurements of only 50 transmissions. We also present an analysis of trade-off between accuracy and latency of detection for our method.
I. INTRODUCTION
Measurements of received signal strength (RSS) on wireless links have found application in various localization systems. RSS measurements have been used to estimate path lengths in multilateration positioning algorithms [1] , to identify a device's location in fingerprint-based localization algorithms [2] [3] [4] and to monitor movement of a person or object through a static link in device-free localization algorithms [5] [6] .
The general method used by RSS based localization schemes in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) involve a number of sensor nodes deployed around the area of interest. These sensor nodes transmit radio signals and the RSS measurements obtained are used to model any perturbation in the wireless environment to provide localization information. More specifically, these RSS measurements (P r ), measured in dBm, are expressed as: P r = P t − P loss (1) where P t is the transmit power in dBm and P loss is the path loss in dB caused by the electromagnetic environment between the transmitter and the receiver antennas. Most of the existing localization schemes based on (1) assume a fixed transmit power. Therefore, any variation in transmit power can result in error in location estimate. Previous work has shown that change in transmit power by 15 dB can introduce up to 30 ft of localization error [7] . The transmit power can vary due to a number of reasons. These include
• Faults : Sensor nodes are prone to develop faults due to depleting battery levels [8] and physical damage. These faults may manifest as changes in transmit power.
• Power control algorithms: Most sensor network applications are strictly power constrained and use power control algorithms which vary transmit power in order to preserve battery life and to reduce interference with other nodes [9] [10]. In such algorithms, where a node changes transmit power, the transmit power level must be communicated to the receiver nodes in the network. However, data corruption (due to packet errors, etc.) or software bugs can introduce cases where a node's transmit power changes without the receiver nodes in the network finding out about the change.
• Adversarial circumstances: Sensor nodes are often deployed in unattended and potentially hostile environments where they are susceptible to node capturing attacks by adversaries [11] [12] . An adversary can manage to capture a few nodes in the network and then reprogram them with malicious code to change their transmit power.
Even when existing localization schemes require the transmit power to be communicated to the receiver, in the case of faulty and adversarial node, there is no guarantee that the correct transmit power gets communicated. We use the term power attack to denote a change in transmit power, not communicated to the receiver nodes, that can cause significant error in the estimated location, regardless of the reason of its occurrence.
In this paper, we show that RSS measurements can be used to detect power attacks reliably in real-time. We present a generic framework for detecting power attacks and identifying the source of such transmit power variation.
We conduct experiments and evaluate our method for indoor settings. Our results show that we can achieve close to zero missed detections and false alarms with RSS measurements of only 50 transmissions. We also present an analysis of trade-off between accuracy and latency of detection for our method. The algorithm developed is of low complexity and hence can be implemented on nodes with few resources.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss some previous approaches to secure WSNs and argue why these would not work for RSS based localization methods. In Section III, we list our assumptions and describe our adversary model. Section IV presents our method to detect changes in RSS caused by a change in transmit power. In Section V and VI, we present our experiments and results respectively and finally conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we present a brief discussion on different approaches that can be used to deal with power attacks.
A. Traditional Approaches
• Key based authentication and encryption methods:
Significant work has involved securing WSNs using traditional key based authentication and encryption protocols [13] [14] . These methods, although resource intensive, do provide admission control and some level of security as long as the adversary is assumed not to gain physical control over the sensor nodes. However, if the adversary has physical control over the nodes, it can obtain security keys and passwords and maliciously insert cloned nodes in the network. The adversary can even reprogram a node to make it behave maliciously while still using the original security keys and passwords.
• Tamper proof memory [11] : This provides a method to secure a node from being reprogrammed by an adversary and when combined with security passwords and keys, can serve to protect a malicious node from affecting the system. However, use of tamper proof memory would result in an increase in the implementation cost of the system. • Using Device signatures [15] : Device signatures can be used as alternative to traditional key based encryption methods. These signatures can protect the system from maliciously inserted cloned nodes. However, most device signatures depend on hardware characteristics and would not change with the software installed on the nodes. Hence, this method is not robust against malicious reprogramming.
B. Secure Localization Methods
Other works on secure localization include SPINE [16] , ROPE [17] , SeRLoc [18] and HirLoc [19] . These works assume the availability of some reference points, special locator nodes or key-based secure communication between anchor nodes to prevent against a variety of attacks in WSNs. Hence, these methods are vulnerable to capture of critical nodes by the adversary.
C. Existing Detection Methods
Chen et al. [20] proposed a generic method for two broad range of active localization methods: multilateration based and RSS based. Their method, however, can not be applied to DFL. In contrast to their work, our method does not use any training data which makes it more suitable for dynamic environments. We also show that we can achieve close to zero missed detection and false alarm rate with only 100 transmissions from an adversarial node varying its power by 5dB whereas Chen et al. could only achieve a detection rate of 40% (missed detection rate of 0.6).
III. ASSUMPTIONS AND ADVERSARY MODEL
We assume that faulty or malicious nodes are never present in majority in the network and all nodes have equal probability of developing fault or being targeted by an adversary. We also assume that the malicious nodes do not collude with each other. We ignore the possibility of an adversary reporting false readings of RSS values it receives from other transmitters. Since faulty nodes are just a weaker form of the adversary being considered, all further discussions apply to both malicious and faulty nodes.
We define two parameters related to an adversary's action which we would then use in our method. As discussed in Section I, an adversary can affect a RSS based localization system by changing the transmit power of a node. We parametrize this action by considering how often and by how much the change occurs. To this effect, we define the following parameters of malicious activity:
• Minimum attack window size (w min ): Defined as the smallest set of contiguous transmissions which would always contain at least one power change. We do not assume any particular profile for power changes and w min can have more than one power change. In real scenarios, w min is not expected to be known beforehand, however an educated guess of w min can be made based on the expected movement activity and noise in WSNs. A detection window can then be chosen from the collected data, of size greater than w min , to detect attack reliably with desired probabilities of detection and false alarm as discussed in section IV-E.
• Minimum attack amplitude (a min ): Defined as the minimum power change required to perform an attack with significant changes in the estimated location. Power attack with an amplitude less than a min are not considered to be significantly harmful to the application, and thus are not important to detect. The value of a min is thus set by the application.
IV. METHOD

A. Network
We assume a WSN with N transceiver nodes. Define, for a transmitter k, a neighbor set given by H k = {n 0 , n 1 , ...n M −1 } consisting of M receivers capable of communicating with k. We make RSS measurements on each link between node pair (k, n l ) where n l ∈ H k . A fully connected network is not required for our detection method, however, the neighbor set for each transmitter is assumed to be known at all nodes and remain constant. Detection in networks where H k can change with time may be considered in future works.
B. Model
Let r k,j (i) be the RSS measured at receiver j for transmission from node k at time i where k ∈ {1, ..., N } and j ∈ H k . We define RSS vector as:
and mean of RSS vector over a window of time T as:
Using (2) and (3), we can define the change in RSS for a transmission of node k at time i as
Next, we consider two cases for ∆r k (i): 1) No attack: When a power attack is not present, changes in RSS can be caused by many reasons. However, these changes are equally likely to increase or decrease the RSS measurement. For example, noise and quantization error are likely to be zero mean. If the sensor moves, it is likely to move towards some nodes and away from others, and therefore changes should be modeled as zero mean. Movement of people and objects in the environment will similarly tend to increase RSS on some links and decrease RSS on others [21] . Thus for generality, we model ∆r k (i) as
where is a vector of zero mean random variables. We do not make any assumptions about the distribution or the correlation between elements of . 2) Attack: When there is a power attack from k, ∆r k (i) can no longer be modeled as a vector of zero mean random variables. For this case, we model ∆r k (i) as
where a k is the transmit power variation by k and
We consider deciding between the following two hypotheses:
• H 0 : No power attack from transmitter k is present.
• H 1 : A power attack from transmitter k is present.
C. Estimating a k
The main difficulty of the detection problem considered is that, under H 1 , we do not know the amplitude, a k , of the power attack a priori. In order to judge the likelihood that H 1 is occurring, we first need to estimate a k .
Since we are estimating a k given H 1 , we know that the amplitude of our estimate must be greater than a min , which is the minimum attack amplitude parameter.
We first defineā as
where M is the size of H k and ∆r k,nj (i) represent the j th element of ∆r k (i). Then, we defineâ k to be an estimate of the attack amplitude asâ
D. Detecting power attack
Next, we consider the problem of detecting a power attack. Define a time window, Q k (i), of p transmissions for transmitter k ending at time i as
Also define a line in space R |H k | , with slope 1, as:
To choose between H 0 and H 1 for the window Q k (i), we use the distance from L to ∆r k (i − j), ∀ j ∈ [0, p) and decide with the hypothesis test
where γ i is an appropriately chosen threshold for the window Q k (i) (as discussed later in Section IV-E). The distance d k (i) is calculated using the estimated parameterâ k as
If there is a power attack at time j such that ∆r k (j) ∈ Q k (i), we can model ∆r k (j) as (6) . This lies in a region of constant diameter around L and hence, d k (j) is smaller than the threshold value γ i . Thus, we choose H 1 for Q k (i).
When there is no attack in Q k (i), ∆r k (j) can lie randomly at any point in space. In this case, d k (j) is greater than γ i ∀ j such that ∆r k (j) ∈ Q k (i) and hence, we can choose H 0 for Q k (i). Figure 1 illustrates attack detection in R 3 where H k = {n 0 , n 1 , n 2 }. The cylinder around L is the detection region. Note that as the number of receivers and thus the number of dimensions increase, the region of constant diameter around L occupies increasingly smaller percentage of total volume in space and the probability of a normal transmission lying in detection region decreases. Hence, the number of false alarms decrease as the total number of receivers increases.
E. Choosing γ i
To successfully detect a power attack, we need to set the threshold appropriately. Since the value of γ i depends on the environment noise, in this section, we describe a method we can use to find the optimal γ i automatically.
For a transmitter k, Q k (i) represents data from a time window of ∆r k (i) of size p. Using (12), we get p distances from L for a transmitter from this data. Let d min denote the vector giving minimum distance points recorded for each transmitter in Q k (i) such that
where
is the k th element of d min which also correspond to the k th transmitter. Let's also define the mean of d min as
and the standard deviation of d min as
Then we chose γ as: If malicious nodes were colluding, there is a possibility that the calculated γ i would always let a few malicious node pass the detection test. However, we leave colluding adversaries for future work. Window size p is chosen such that it is greater than the estimated parameter w min .
F. Evaluation
We evaluate our detection algorithm based on probability of false alarm and probability of missed detections defined as below:
• False alarm (P F A ): power attack detected for a normal node.
• Missed detection (P M ): failure to detect power attack by a malicious node.
V. EXPERIMENTS
This section describes the experiments we perform for testing our proposed detection algorithm. We deploy a network of eighteen TelosB wireless sensors nodes in an indoor lab for the experiments presented in this paper. The nodes operate in the 2.4 GHz frequency band. A token-passing protocol called Spin [22] is used to schedule transmission of nodes in a manner which prevents packet collisions while still maintaining high data collection rate. When one node transmits, all other nodes receive the packet and make the RSS measurements. These RSS measurements are transmitted to a base station along with the node's unique ID. The base station collects all RSS measurements and forwards the data to a laptop for storage and later processing.
We define a spin cycle as one round of the token passing scheduling protocol used. Each spin cycle consist of RSS We perform two experiments. The experimental setup is shown in Figure 2 .
1) No-attack During this experiment, there is no attack in the network. The subject walks in a random pattern in the network for a 8 minute period. The nodes transmit at their normal power at 4 transmissions per second.
2) Attack
To simulate a power attack, we program node 0 at location (0,0) with malicious code which modifies the transmit power once every 16 transmissions. All nodes still transmit at 4 transmissions per second. The subject performs same motion, as in No-attack experiment, in the monitored area. For the Attack experiment, we set a min to be 3 dB. Further, no one other than the subject is present in the network area during both the experiments.
VI. RESULTS
This section presents the results for the two experiments described in Section V and an analysis of the trade-off between accuracy and latency of detection for our method.
First, we present results for the No-attack experiment. We validate our model with a sample data set of 50 consecutive spin cycles. Each spin cycle gives us one data point ∆r k (i) in R |H k | space for each node. The distance of this data point from L , d k (i), is calculated for all k and plotted in Figure 3 . From the distances plotted, we pick the minimum distance for each node and use the minimums to calculate the threshold distance γ i as discussed in (16) . This theshold is also plotted in Figure 3 .
From Figure 3 , we observe that the minimums of all nodes lie above the threshold γ i . Hence we detect no malicious activity, which is the correct decision for the No-attack experiment.
Then, we present the results for the Attack experiment. This experiment simulates the scenario with one malicious node in the network. We program node 0 to act maliciously by varying its transmit power once every 16 transmissions. Figure 4 plots the distances for every node from L. From the figure, we observe that some of the data points from node 0 are below the threshold γ i . These data points correspond to the malicious transmissions from node 0. Hence, using (11), we can accurately detect malicious activity with RSS data from 50 consecutive spin cycles and also identify the malicious node in the network.
Next, we use the data from Attack experiment to evaluate the trade-off between accuracy and latency of detection. We analyze the characteristics of P F A and P M with number of transmissions for this data.
We choose a window of p consecutive transmissions where p ∈ (16, 300) and calculate P F D and P M by sampling over a large data set. Since we are choosing a window size greater than 16, every window will have at least one malicious transmission from node 0. We detect a hit if at least one of the data point for node 0 lies below the calculated threshold. If all the points for node 0 are above the threshold, it is a missed detection. Similarly, for a normal node, we get a false alarm if any one of its data point lie below the threshold. Note that we consider a false alarm for any normal node to be a false alarm for the method as a whole.
We plot probability of false alarm and probability of missed detection, when p consecutive transmissions are used for detection, for actual transmit power variation, a k , of 5 dB and 10 dB in Figures 5 and 6 respectively. From the plots, we observe that higher detection accuracy can be obtained with a bigger window of consecutive transmissions which, however, implies a higher latency in detection. P F D and P M are almost zero after 100 transmissions for the 5 dB case and 50 transmissions for the 10 dB case.
Using the above plots, we can get an estimate of time required to detect a malicious transmission in real time. For this experiment, the mean interval between two successive transmissions by a node was around 250 ms. Hence, we can detect malicious activity with 100% accuracy (0 missed detection, 0 false alarms) in 25 seconds for 5 dB variations and in 12.5 seconds for 10 dB variations. In this paper, we explore a security problem with RSSbased localization techniques in which unreported changes in transmit power can result in inaccurate location estimates. These changes in transmit power can be caused by a faulty node or a malicious node. We develop a method to detect such changes in transmit power using only RSS measurements and present detection performance of our detector in indoor environment.
